Nuclear War Survival Skills Part 1

TYPES OF WARNINGS

Warnings are of two types, Strategic and tactical

Strategic warning is based on observed enemy actions that are believed to be preparations for an attack.

Tactical warnings of a nuclear attack on the United States would be received by our highest officials a few minutes after missiles or other nuclear weapons  had been launched against our country. Then, attack warnings would have to b e transmitted down to communities all over America.

OFFICIAL WARNING SYSTEM

The U.S. official warning system is designed to give civilians timely warning by means of siren signals and radio and television announcements. The National Warning System (NAWAS) is a wire-line network which is to provide attack information to official warning points nationwide. NAWAS is not protected against electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects from nuclear explosions. When the information is received at warning points by the officials who are responsible, they will sound local sirens and initiate radio and TV emergency broadcasts – if power has not failed. Officials at NAWAS warning points include many local civil defense directors. NAWAS receives information from ourconstantly improving military warning and communicationssystems.

SIREN WARNINGS 

The Attack Warning Signal is a wavering, wailing sound on the sirens lasting three to five minutes, ora series of short blasts on whistles or horns. After a brief pause, it is repeated. This signal means only one thing: take protective action- go promptly to the best available shelter. Do not try to telephone for information; get information from a radio broadcast after you reach shelter. It is Federal policy that the Attack Warning Signal will not be sounded unless an enemy attack on the United States has been detected. However, since local authorities may not follow this policy, the reader is advised to check the plans in his community before a crisis arises.

The following limitations of attack warnings given by sirens and broadcasting stations should be recognized:

° Only a relatively small fraction of urban Americans could hear the sirens in the present city systems, especially if most urban citizens had evacuated during a crisis.

° Except in a crisis threatening the outbreak of nuclear war at any moment, most people who would hear the attack warning signal either would not recognize it or would not believe it was a warning of actual attack.

° A coordinated enemy attack may include the detonation of a few’ submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) at high altitudes over the United States within a few minutes of the launching of hundreds of SLBMs and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Such high-altitude bursts would produce electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects primarily intended to knock out or disrupt U.S. military communications. These EMP effects also could knock out the public power necessary to sound sirens and could put most unprotected broadcasting stations off the air.

Radio warnings and emergency communications to the general public will be broadcast by the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS). This system uses AM broadcasting stations as the primary means to reach the public; selected FM and TV stations are included for backup. All stations during a crisis plan to use their normal broadcast frequencies.

EBS stations that are not put off the air by EMP or other effects of early explosions will attempt to confirm the siren warnings of a nuclear attack. They will try to give information to listeners in the extensive areas where sirens and whistles cannot be heard. However, EMP effects on telephones are

likely to limit the information available to the stations. The functioning EBS stations should be able to warn listeners to seek the best available nearby shelter in time for most of these listeners to reach such shelter before ICBMs begin to explode. Limitations of the Emergency Broadcasting System in February 1986 included the fact that EMP protection had been completed for only 125 of the approximately 2,771 radio stations in the Emergency Broadcast System. One hundred and ten of 3,000 existing Emergency Operating Centers also had been protected against EMP effects. Many of the protected stations would be knocked out by blast; most do not afford their operating personnel fallout protection that is adequate for continuing broadcasts for long in areas subjected to heavy fallout.

WARNINGS GIVEN BY THE ATTACK ITSELF 

The great majority of Americans would not be injured by the first explosions of a nuclear attack. In an all-out attack, the early explosions would give sufficient warning for most people to reach nearby shelter in time. Fifteen minutes or more before big intercontinental ballistic missiles (lCBMs) blasted our cities, missile sites, and other extensive areas, most citizens would see the sky lit up to an astounding brightness, would hear the thunderoussounds of distant explosions, or would note the sudden outage of
electric power and most communications. These reliable attack warnings would result from the explosion of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). These are smaller than many ICBMs. The SLBM warheads would explode on Strategic Air Command bases and on many civilian airport runways that are long enough to be used by our big bombers. Some naval bases and high-priority military command and communication centers would also be targeted.

The vast majority of Americans do not know how to use these warnings from explosions to help them save their lives. Neither are they informed about the probable strategies of an enemy nuclear attack.

One of the first objectives of a coordinated enemy attack would be to destroy our long-range bombers, because each surviving U.S. bomber would be one of our most deadly retaliatory weapons. Once bombers are airborne and well away from their runways, they arc difficult to destroy.

To destroy our bombers before they could get away, the first SLBMs would be launched at the same time that ICBMs would be fired from their silos in Europe and Asia. U.S. surveillance systems would detect launchings and transmit warnings within a very few minutes. Since some enemy submarineswould be only a few hundred miles from their targets, some SLBMs would explode on American targets about 15 or 20 minutes before the first lCBMs would hit.

Some SLBMs would strike civilian airport runways that are at least 7000 Ft long. This is the minimum length required by B-52s; there were 210 such runways in the U.S. in 1977. During a crisis, big bombers would be dispersed to many of these long runways, and enemy SLBMs would be likely to target and hit these runways in an effort to destroy the maximum number of bombers.

Today most Soviet SLBMs have warheads between 100 kilotons and one megaton. See Jane’s Weapon Systems, 1987-88. Within 10 to 15 minutes of the beginning of an attack, runways 7000 feet or longer are likely to be hit by airbursts, to destroy U.S. aircraft and airport facilities. Later cratering explosions may be used to destroy surviving long runways, or at least to produce local fallout so heavy that they could not be used for several days for rearming and refueling our bombers. Therefore, homes within about 4 miles of a runway at least 7000 ft long are likely to be destroyed before residents receive warning or have time to reach blast shelters away from their homes. Homes six miles away could be lightly damaged by such a warhead, with the blast wave from a 1-megaton explosion arriving about 22 seconds after the warning light. Some windows would be broken 40 miles away. But the large majority of citizens would not be injured by these early SLBM attacks. These explosions would be life-saving “take cover warnings to most Americans, if they have been properly informed.

Sudden power and communications failures caused by the electromagnetic pulse (EM P) effects of nuclear explosions also could serve as attack warnings in extensive areas. An EMP is an intense burst of radio- frequency radiation generated by a nuclear explosion. The strong, quick-rising surges of electric current induced by EMP in power transmission lines and long antennas could burn out most unprotected electrical and electronic equipment. Also, likely to be damaged or destroyed would be unprotected computers. The solid state electrical components of some aircraft and of some motors of modern autos, trucks, and tractors may be put out of commission. Metal bodies give some protection, whereas plastic bodies give little.

The usual means of protecting electrical equipment against surges of current produced by lightning are generally ineffective against EMP. The protective measures are known, but to date all too few civilian installations have been protected against EMP effects. Three or four nuclear weapons skillfully spaced and detonated at high altitudes over the United States would produce EMP effects that might knock out most public power, most radio and TV broadcasting stations lacking special protection against these effects, and most radios connected to long antennas. Nuclear explosions on or near the ground may produce damaging EMP effects over areassomewhat larger than those in which such equipment and buildings would be damaged by the blast effects.

HOW TO RESPOND TO UNEXPECTED ATTACK WARNINGS 

Although a Pearl-Harbor-type of attack is unlikely, citizens should be prepared to respond effectively to unexpected warnings.

These warnings include:  Extremely bright lights-more light than has been seen before. The dazzling, bright lights of the first SLBM explosions on targets in many parts of the United States would be seen by most Americans. One should not look to determine the source of light and heat, because there is danger of the viewer’s eyes being damaged by the heat and light from a large explosion at distances as far as a hundred miles away, in clear weather. Look down and away from the probable source, and quickly get behind anything that will shield you from most of the thermal pulse’s burning heat and intense light. A thermal pulse delivers its heat and light for several seconds- for more than 11 seconds if it is from a 1 -megaton surface burst and for approximately 44 seconds if from a 20- megaton surface burst.

If you are at home when you see the amazingly bright light, run out of rooms with windows. Hurry to awindowless hallway or down into the basement. If you have a shelter close to your house, but separate from it, do not leave the best cover in your home to run outdoors to reach the shelter; wait until about two minutes after first seeing the light.

If outdoors when yousee the bright light, get behind the best available cover.

It would be impossible to estimate the distance to an explosion from its light or appearance, so you should stay under cover for about two minutes. A blast wave initially travels much faster than the normal speed of sound (about 1 mile in 5 seconds). But by the time its overpressure has decreased to 1 pound per square inch (psi), a blast wave and its thunderous sound have slowed down and are moving only about 3% faster than the normal speed of sound.

If no blast or sound reaches you in two minutes, you would know that the explosion was over 25 miles away and you would not be hurt by blast effects. After two minutes you can safely leave the best cover in your home and get a radio. Turn the dial to the stations to which you normally listen and try to find information. Meanwhile, quickly make preparations to go to the best shelter you and your family can reach within I5 minutes, the probable time interval before the first lCBMs start to explode.

At no time after an attack begins should you look out of a window or stay near a window. Under certain atmospheric conditions, windows can be shattered by a multi-megaton explosion a hundred miles away.

° The sound of explosions

The thunderous booms of the initial SLBM explosions would be heard over almost all parts of the United States. Persons one hundred miles away from a nuclear explosion may receive their first warning by hearing it about 7-1/2 minutes later. Most would have time to reach nearby shelter before the lCBMs begin to explode.

° Loss of electric power and communications

If the lights go out and you find that many radio and TV stations are suddenly off the air, continue to dial if you have a battery-powered radio, and try to find a station that is still broadcasting

HOW TO RESPOND TO ATTACK WARNINGS DURING A WORSENING CRISIS 

If an attack takes place during a worsening crisis, the effectiveness of warnings would be greater. Even if our government did not order an evacuation of high-risk areas, millions of Americans would already have moved to safer areas if they had learned that the enemy’s urban civilians were evacuating or that tactical nuclear weapons were being employed overseas. Many prudent citizens would sleep inside the best available shelter and stay in or near shelter most of their waking hours. Many people would have made or improved family car small-group shelters and would have supplied them with most essentials. The official warning systems would have been fully alerted and improved.

During such a tense crisis period, neighbors or people sheltered near each other should have someone listen to radio stations at all times of the day and night. If the situation worsened or an attack warning were broadcast, the listener could alert the others.

One disadvantage of waiting to build expedient shelters until there isa crisis is that many of the builders are likely to be outdoors improving their shelters when the first SLBMs are launched. The SLBM warheads may arrive so soon that the civilian warning systems cannot respond in time. To reduce the risk of being burned, persons working outdoors when expecting an attack should wear shirts, hats, and gloves. They should jump into a shelter or behind a nearby shielding object at the first warning, which may be the sudden cut-off of some radio broadcasts.

REMAINING INSIDE SHELTER 

Curiosity and ignorance probably will cause many people to come out of shelters a few hours after an attack warning, if no blast or obvious fallout has endangered their area. This is dangerous, because several hours after almost all missiles have been launched the first enemy bombers may strike. Cities and other targets that have been spared because missiles malfunctioned or missed are likely to be destroyed by nuclear bombs dropped during the first several days after the first attack.

Most people should stay inside their shelters for at least two or three days, even if they are in a locality far from a probable target and even if fallout meter readings prove there is no dangerous fallout. Exceptions would include some of the people who would need to improve shelters or move to better shelters. Such persons could do so at relatively small risk during the interval between the ICBM explosions and the arrival of enemy bombers and; or the start of fallout deposition a few hours, later.

Fallout would cover most of the United States within 12 hours after a massive attack. People could rarely depend on information received from distant radio stations regarding changing fallout dangers and advising when and for how long they could go outside their shelters. Weather conditions such aswind speed would cause fallout dangers to vary with distance. If not forced by thirst or hunger to leave shelter, they should depend on their own fallout meter readings or on radiation measurements made by neighbors or local civil defense workers.

PSYCHOLOGICAL PREPERATIOS  

Terror is a self-destructive emotion, is almost always the result of unexpected danger. The bursts of nuclear weapons might cause people to give up all hope. People are more likely to endure and survive if they learn in advance that what is happening and what to expect.

FEAR 

Fear can be a life-saving emotion. It can increase our ability to work harder and longer. Driven by fear, we can accomplish feats that would be impossible otherwise.

Brave men and women who are self-confident admit their fears, even when the threat of death is remote. Then they plan and work to lessen the causes of their fears. (When the author helped Charles A. Lindbergh design a reinforced-concrete blast shelter for his family and neighbors, Lindbergh frankly admitted that he feared both nuclear attack and being trapped. He was able to lessen both of these fears by building an excellent blast shelter with two escape openings.)

TERROR 

If the danger is unexpected enough or great enough, normal persons sometimes experience terror as well as fear. Terror prevents the mind from evaluating dangers and thinking logically. It develops in two
stages, which have been described by Dr. Walo von Gregerz, a physician with much war experience, in his bookPsychology of Survival. The first stage is apathy: people become indifferent to their own safety and are unable even to try to save themselves or their families. The second stage is a compulsion to flee.

Anxiety, fear, and terror can result in symptoms very similar to those caused by radiation injury: nausea, vomiting, extreme trembling, diarrhea. Dr. von Gregerz has described terror as being “explosively contagious.” However, persons who learn to understand the nature of our inherent humantraits and behavior and symptoms are less likely to become terrorized and ineffective in the event of a nuclear attack.

EMOTIONAL PARALYSIS 

The most common reaction to great danger is not terror, but a kind of numbing of the emotions which actually may be helpful. Dr. von Gregerz calls this “emotional paralysis. “This reaction allows many persons, when in the grip of great danger, to avoid being overwhelmed by compassionate emotions and horrible sights. It permits them to think clearly and act effectively.

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HELP FROM FELLOW AMERICANS 

 

The atomic explosions that destroyed most of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were air bursts and therefore produced no deadly local fallout. So we cannot be sure how people would behave in areas subjected to both blast and fallout from surface bursts. However, the reactions of the Japanese survivors are encouraging, especially in view of the fact that among them the relative number of horribly burned people was greater than is likely to be found among a population that expects a nuclear attack and takes any sort of shelter. Dr. von Gregerz summarizes: “In most cases the victims were, of course, apathetic and often incapable of rational action, but open panic or extremely disorganized behavior occurred only in exceptional cases among the hundreds of thousands of survivors of the two atomic bombing attacks.”Also encouraging: “. . . serious permanent psychological derangements were rare after the atomic bomb attacks, just as they were after the large-scale conventional bombings.”

 

ATOM BOMB SURVIVORS 

Some maintain that after an atomic attack America would degenerate into anarchy an every-
man-for-himself struggle for existence. They forget the history of great human catastrophes and the self-sacrificing strengths most human beings are capable of displaying. After a massive nuclear attack starvation would afflict some areas, but America’s grain-producing regions still would have an abundance of uncontaminated food. History indicates that Americans in the food-rich areas would help the starving. Like the heroic Russians who drove food trucks to starving Leningrad through bursting Nazi bombs and shells.7 many Americans would risk radiation and other dangers to bring truckloads of grain and other necessities to their starving countrymen. Surely, an essential part of psychological preparations for surviving a modern war is a well- founded assurance that many citizens of a strong society will struggle to help each other and will work together with little regard for danger and loss.

HOW TO KEEP RADIOS OPERATING 

Having a radio to receive emergency broadcasts would be a great advantage. The stations that would still be on the air after an attack would probably be too distant from most survivors to give them reliable information concerning local, constantly changing fallout dangers. However, both morale and the prospects of long-range survival would be improved in shelters with aradio bringing word of the large-area fallout situation, food-relief measures, practical survival skills, and what the government and other organizations were doing to help. Radio contact with the outside world probably can be maintained after an attack if you remember to:

° Bring all of your family’s battery-powered, portable radios with you to shelter along with all fresh batteries on hand.

° Protect AM radios by using only their built-in short loop antennas. The built-in antennas of small portable radios are too short for EMP to induce damaging surges of current in them.

° Keep antennas of FM, CB, and amateur radios as short as practical, preferably less than 10 inches. When threatened by EMP, a danger that may continue forweeks after the initial attack because of repeated, high-altitude explosions, do not add a wire antenna or connect a short radio antenna to a pipe. Remember that a surge of current resulting from EMP especially can damage diodes and transistors, thus ending a radio’s usefulness or reducing its range of reception.

° Keep all unshielded radios at least six feet away from any long piece of metal, such as pipes, metal ducts, or wires found in many basements and other shelters. Long metal conductors can pick up and carry large EMP surges, causing induced current to surge in nearby radios and damage them.

° Shield each radio against EMP when not in use by completely surrounding it with conducting metal if it is kept within six feet of a long conductor through which powerful currents produced by EMP might surge. A radio may be shielded against EMP by placing it inside a metal cake box or metal storage can,or by completely surrounding it with aluminum foil or metallic window screen.

° Disconnect the antenna cable of your car radio at the receiver or at least ground the antennawhen not in use by connecting it with a wire to the car frame. Use tape or clothespins to assure good metal-to-metal contact. The metal of an outside mirror is a convenient grounding-point. Park your car as near to your shelter as practical, so that after fallout has decayed sufficiently you may be able to use the car radio to get distant stations that are still broadcasting.

° Prevent possible damage to a radio from extreme dampness (which may result from long occupancy of some below ground shelters) by keeping it sealed in a clear plastic bag large enough so the radio can be operated while inside. An additional precaution is to keep a plastic-covered radio in an air-tight container with some anhydrite made from wallboard gypsum, as described in Appendix C.

° Conserve batteries, because after an attack you may not be able to get replacements for months. Listen only periodically, to the stations you find give the most useful information. The batteries of transistor radios will last up to twice as long if the radios are played at reduced volume.